“Much as I dislike the idea of ages, I think a good case can be made that science has now moved from an Age of Reductionism to an Age of Emergence, a time when the search for ultimate causes of things shifts from the behavior of parts to the behavior of the collective” (Laughlin 2005 , p. 208). This quotation by Nobel laureate in physics, Robert B. Laughlin, in his recent book, A Different Universe , raises interesting scientific and philosophical (...) issues. Bench chemists continue successfully to synthesize new compounds and report results through quantitative and structural analyses of constitutive elements. The whole continues to be understood by analysis of the parts. The relatively recent science of emergence comes with a different perspective: how to explain novel, irreducible, and unpredictable appearances in cosmic evolution? New wholes seem to be more that the sum of their parts. How do these wholes come to exist? Do classical concepts of matter satisfy the science of emergence? Descriptions of nature’s phenomena that challenge classical interpretations of the “Age of Reductionism” are presented to stimulate possible new scientific and philosophical concepts for an age of reductionism and emergence. (shrink)

Fierce debates surround the conceptualization and measurement of job-related distress in occupational health science. The use of burnout as an index of job-related distress, though commonplace, has increasingly been called into question. In this paper, we first highlight foundational problems that undermine the burnout construct and its legacy measure, the Maslach Burnout Inventory. Next, we report on advances in research on job-related distress that depart from the use of the burnout construct. Tracing the genesis of the burnout construct, we observe (...) that burnout’s definition was preestablished rather than derived from a rigorous research process and the MBI has little in the way of a theoretical or empirical foundation. Historical analysis suggests that the burnout construct was cobbled together from unchallenged personal impressions and anecdotal evidence before getting reified by the MBI. This state of affairs may account for many of the disconcerting problems encountered in burnout research. We close our paper by presenting the Occupational Depression Inventory, a recently developed instrument reflective of a renewed approach to job-related distress. The ODI has demonstrated robust psychometric and structural properties across countries, sexes, age groups, occupations, and languages. The instrument addresses job-related distress both dimensionally and categorically. A dimensional approach can be useful, for instance, in examining the dynamics of etiological processes and symptom development. A categorical approach can serve screening and diagnostic purposes and help clinicians and public health professionals in their decision-making. It is concluded that the ODI offers occupational health specialists a promising way forward. (shrink)

THE LIFE Of FRANCIS BACON, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND. THE ancient Egyptians had a law, which ordained that the actions and characters of their dead ...

The Novum Organum, (or Novum Organum Scientiarum - "New Instrument of Science"), is a philosophical work by Francis Bacon, originally published in 1620. The title is a reference to Aristotle's work Organon, which was his treatise on logic and syllogism. In Novum Organum, Bacon details a new system of logic he believes to be superior to the old ways of syllogism. This is now known as the Baconian method.

We investigate the notion of relevance as it pertains to ‘commonsense’, subjunctive conditionals. Relevance is taken here as a relation between a property (such as having a broken wing) and a conditional (such as birds typically fly). Specifically, we explore a notion of ‘causative’ relevance, distinct from ‘evidential’ relevance found, for example, in probabilistic approaches. A series of postulates characterising a minimal, parsimonious concept of relevance is developed. Along the way we argue that no purely logical account of relevance (even (...) at the metalevel) is possible. Finally, and with minimal restrictions, an explicit definition that agrees with the postulates is given. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground*James P. ScanlanWriting in his own voice, in letters, notebooks, and diaries, Fyodor Dostoevsky frequently attacked the philosophy of the Russian “nihilists,” as he typically called them—Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Dmitry Pisarev, and other representatives of the radical Russian intelligentsia in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. But because Dostoevsky also used fiction to argue against them, if we wish (...) to discern the full contours of his opposition, we must turn to his stories and novels; and there we face the problem of determining to what extent, if any, the statements of his narrators and characters express his own views.This problem is particularly challenging in regard to the radicals’ “Rational Egoism,” to use the label by which the Russian variant of the theory of enlightened egoism came to be known. 1 Dostoevsky’s most sustained and spirited attack on that aspect of “nihilist” philosophy is found in Part One of Notes from Underground (1864), but it is voiced by one of the darkest, least sympathetic of all his characters—the nameless narrator and protagonist known as the Underground Man. Was this repellent creature speaking for Dostoevsky? The Underground Man, moreover, can easily be viewed as a sheer irrationalist whose rejection of Rational Egoism is a tortured emotional outburst with no logical credentials. Robert L. Jackson, in his groundbreaking study of 1958, describes the Underground Man’s thinking at one point as follows: “It is impossible to argue [End Page 549] with the rationalists: reason is on their side. All that remains is irrationally to negate reason.” 2 If those words were to be taken not simply as a moment in Jackson’s rich analysis but as a comprehensive description of the Underground Man’s attitude, it would be senseless to expect philosophically nuanced arguments from him. And we would have no grounds for thinking that Dostoevsky’s own treatment of Rational Egoism went beyond emotional rejection.Critics from Vasily Rozanov to Joseph Frank have debated the Underground Man’s stance toward Rational Egoism and its relation to Dostoevsky’s, with no sign yet of a definitive resolution. Frank’s recent treatment, presented in the third volume of his monumental literary biography of Dostoevsky, offers a helpful history of the dispute as well as his own finely elaborated interpretation of the Underground Man as an irrational opponent of Rational Egoism. 3 Frank reads Notes from Underground as satire, and he contends that the Underground Man is caught in an agonizing self-contradiction: intellectually, he accepts the basic premises of the Rational Egoists’ outlook, such as the denial of free will; but he finds that, “despite the convictions of his reason,” he cannot live with the amoral and dehumanizing implications of those premises, which strip human beings of moral responsibility. 4 From a rational point of view, of course, rejection of the implications should force the Underground Man to reject the premises as well (by the hoary logical law of modus tollendo tolens), and indeed he does at times passionately condemn them. But according to Frank, these condemnations simply show the depth of his predicament: his “intellectual acceptance” of Chernyshevsky’s determinism is conjoined with “simultaneous rejection of it with the entire intuitive-emotional level of personality identified with moral conscience,” causing him to respond irrationally in a multitude of instances. 5 Frank’s Underground Man, then, is an intellectual disciple but an emotional critic of Rational Egoism; and he is triply an irrationalist: his thinking is mired in self-contradiction, he acts irrationally as a result, and his opposition to Rational Egoism has not a rational but an “intuitive-emotional” basis.But where does this leave Dostoevsky? Must we conclude that he, too, is somehow suspended between acceptance and rejection of Rational Egoism and for that reason has created in Notes from Underground a Bakhtinian equilibrium in which neither position is clearly privileged? For Frank, certainly not. It follows from Frank’s analysis that Dostoevsky himself, unlike the Underground [End Page 550] Man, is a fully consistent opponent of Rational Egoism, for that theory is the target of the inverted irony at the core of his satire; “the... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

For an American philosopher participating in a cultural exchangeprogram with the Soviet Union in 1964–65, a year spent in thePhilosophy Faculty of Moscow State University, studying and doingresearch in the history of Russian philosophy, provided manyinteresting insights – some of them surprising – into the theoryand practice of Marxism-Leninism and the nature of philosophicaleducation in Russia in the 1960s.

In softening Marx' economic determinism, Engels appears to have rescued it from absurdity. In fact, he has condemned it to vacuity: it seems to explain everything, while in fact explaining nothing.

In softening Marx' economic determinism, Engels appears to have rescued it from absurdity. In fact, he has condemned it to vacuity: it seems to explain everything, while in fact explaining nothing.

Russian social and political philosophy of the post-Soviet period continues to be dominated by the vexed question, already featured in the Fall 1992 and several subsequent issues of this journal, of Russia's likeness or unlikeness to the developed democratic societies of the West. The articles in the present issue focus on several closely interrelated aspects of this broad question: Is there a peculiarly Russian route to social reconstruction? What are the prospects, if any, for liberalism and civil society in Russia? (...) To what extent, if any, should Russia remain socialist in some form? Do the doctrines of pre-Revolutionary, non-Marxist Russian philosophers, now widely available to the reading public, have special relevance to Russia's problems? (shrink)

A previous issue of this journal examined the contemporary resurgence, as Russians reflect on the historical fate of their country and its prospects, of the old theme of "Russia and the West," and in particular the question of the relevance and value to Russia of Western ideas and institutions. The articles in that issue, for the most part, reflected the position of thinkers who find the West an appropriate model for Russia's future. The present issue, by contrast, is devoted to (...) the view of those who contend that the Western experience is either dangerous or of questionable value in application to Russia, because Russia has a unique identity that must guide the rebuilding of the country from the ashes of communism. (shrink)

After thirty years as Soviet Studies in Philosophy, this journal begins a new volume year with a new name—Russian Studies in Philosophy. The title change reflects not a shift in content but simply the disappearance of the term "Soviet" from the world map. Even before the dissolution of the USSR, items selected for translation in this journal were drawn exclusively from Russian-language Soviet publications, though the authors were not always Russians: they have included Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, and representatives of other (...) former Soviet republics. This same range of publications and contributors will provide the contents of the journal under its new name, with appropriate additions as new Russian-language publications arise in the increasingly open post-Soviet world. (shrink)

Among the principal manifestations of glasnost' in Soviet intellectual life today is the publication of writers who earlier were denied a broad forum for the expression of their views. In the sphere of philosophy, one such writer is Iakov Mil'ner-Irinin, with whose article on the concept of human nature in ethics the present issue begins. Mil'ner-Irinin, a philosopher who has worked as an editor at the publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, has long advocated an approach to ethics (...) that is heretical by orthodox Marxist-Leninist standards—a Kantian treatment of the field as a purely normative science that elaborates the universally necessary, prescriptive laws of conscience. In 1963 the Academy considered publishing a book on the subject by Mil 'ner-Irinin, but the project was dropped after heated debate, and when some of Mil 'ner-Irinin's views did find an outlet in an article he published in the Georgian republic, they were criticized severely by the Soviet philosophical establishment. (shrink)

The articles included in the present issue of Soviet Studies in Philosophy are drawn entirely from two recent issues of Voprosy filosofii, the oldest and most widely read Soviet philosophy journal. The items have been selected in an effort to provide a picture of that journal's current status and objectives, both as described by its editors and as reflected in the scope and character of some of its philosophically most interesting contents.